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Faced with ever-decreasing revenues since the emergence of
Napster in 1999,1 the music industry has reacted to the development
of peer-to-peer ("p2p") file-sharing with a wide-variety of approaches
aimed at eradicating illegal downloading. The industry's strategies
have included lawsuits against p2p providers and users, sabotage
tactics to corrupt illegal download sites, application of digital rights
management ("DRM") technology to prevent or limit copying, lobbying
for favorable legislation, 2 agreements between universities and legal
online providers to provide students with "free" legal music, and
educational campaigns to better inform the public about copyright law
and the impacts of illegal downloading. 3 These strategies have been
fairly effective in discouraging illegal downloading; for example,
Grokster, Ltd., announced in November 2005 that it would
discontinue its decentralized file-swapping site and restructure itself
as a licensed service in the wake of the United States Supreme Court's
June 2005 decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster,
4
Ltd.

However, some commentators have observed that trying to
eradicate illegal file sharing is not unlike trying to sandbag a flooding
Mississippi river: complete success will remain elusive.
These
skeptics predict that: (a) illegal file sharing will increase as more
households buy computers and install high-speed internet, and (b)
new illegal p2p sites will inevitably emerge, domestically or abroad, to
replace the latest dismantled Grokster and provide consumers access
to illegal downloads. Nevertheless, complete eradication of illegal
downloading is not entirely necessary to maintain the prosperity of
the music industry. A minimal level of illegal file sharing by
committed pirates is to be expected, and will not prevent the music
industry from creating a legitimate digital marketplace that is
comparatively more attractive for consumers than the illegal filesharing networks.
To successfully adapt in the age of digital music distribution,
current strategies to discourage piracy can continue to be
implemented, but ultimately the music industry and Congress must
establish a marketplace that will allow legal downloading services to
flourish and offer a comparably more attractive service than their
1.

See Justin Hughes, On the Logic of Suing One's Customers and the Dilemma of

Infringement-BasedBusiness Models, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 725, 726-27 (2005).

2.
3.
4.

Id. at 726.
Id. at 746.
125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005); see John Borland, Last Waltz for Grokster, CNET

News.com, Nov.
5937832.html.

7,

2005,

http://news.com.com/Last+waltz+for+Grokster/2100-1027_3-
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illegal counterparts. Section I of this paper discusses benchmarks
that must be achieved to improve the legal downloading services.
Section II discusses aspects of the current legal and licensing regime
that serve as impediments to implementation of the legal downloading
service business model. Section III proposes a legislative agenda to
reform the marketplace, achieve the goals articulated in Section I, and
maintain competition and profitability for the players in the evolving
digital music distribution market.
I.

THE MODEL LEGAL DOWNLOADING SERVICE

To make legal downloading services more attractive than their
illegal counterparts, the music industry must accomplish two primary
goals: (a) offer a larger catalogue of downloadable music and (b) allow
for compatibility of devices used by consumers for downloading,
playback, and storage.
Additionally, a competitive marketplace
should ensure that online music providers will: (1) offer individual
songs in addition to albums; (2) set affordable prices for downloads; (3)
allow for reasonable personal uses of downloads by consumers,
including the ability to make limited copies of recordings; (4) offer
incentives, like sponsored downloads and prizes; and (5) provide
security from computer viruses.
The greatest impediment to the success of the online music
services has been their inability to offer a sufficient amount and
variety of downloadable music to compete with the offerings on illegal
file-sharing sites. An estimated 870 million songs are currently
available illegally, as opposed to 1 million legally. 5 To offer more
extensive catalogues online, partnerships and increased cooperation
among the various industry players are needed, as well as legislative
changes, to be discussed in Sections II and III below, to allow for more
streamlined and cost-effective licensing procedures.
With respect to compatibility of devices for downloading,
playback, and storage, Apple's iTunes online music store ("iTunes")
and the iPod portable music player ("iPod") are good examples of
proprietary product designs that do not aid in the struggle against
piracy. While the selection for portable music players is broad and
includes CD players, other MP3 players, and MiniDisc players, the
iPod is the only portable music player authorized and licensed by
Apple to play music securely encoded with Apple's Advanced Audio

5.
International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), Digital Music
Report 2005: Facts and Figures, http://www.pro-music.org/musiconline/
news050119c.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2005).
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Coding ("AAC") codec. 6 To recapture customers from the illegal filesharing networks, reverse-engineering for the limited purpose of
achieving interoperability should be permitted and will be discussed
further in Sections II and III below.
II. LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS TO ATTAINMENT OF THE Two PRIMARY GOALS

A. Difficulties Faced by Legal Downloading Services in Clearing
Licenses
Digital downloads, referred to in Section 115(d) of the
Copyright Act as digital phonorecord deliveries ("DPDs"), are digital
audio transmissions that result in a specifically identifiable
reproduction of a phonorecord on a recipient's hard drive. 7 As such,
DPDs share the same basic ownership qualities as physical compact
discs, in that they result in a permanent copy of a song that can be
privately replayed any number of times. Although digital music can
also be accessed via streaming transmissions, whereby no
reproduction is made in connection with the transmission, this paper
focuses on DPDs and the business environment that is needed to more
8
effectively market them.
When a legal downloading service seeks to make a DPD
available to the public, it must secure four licenses: (a) the
composition copyright owner's right to reproduce 9 and distribute the
composition; (b) the sound recording copyright owner's right to
reproduce and distribute the recording; (c) the composition copyright
owner's right to authorize public performances of the composition; and
(d) the sound recording copyright owner's right to authorize public
performances of the digitally transmitted sound recording. 0
Copyright law is presently unsettled with respect to whether DPDs

6.
Some commentators have suggested that Apple's symbiotic linking of AAC
encoded music between iTunes and iPod potentially violates antitrust regulations. See
Eddy Hsu, Antitrust Regulation Applied to Problems in Cyberspace: iTunes and iPod, 9
INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 117 (2005).
7.
See 17 U.S.C. § 115(d) (2000); AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON MUSIC
LICENSING 1298 (3rd ed. 2000).
8.
Also outside of the scope of this essay are tethered and ephemeral downloads
(as they fall outside of the Copyright Act's definition of DPDs) and issues pertaining to
Internet radio.
9.
Throughout this essay, references to the reproduction right also simultaneously
refer to the distribution right.
10.
See KOHN & KOHN, supra note 7, at 1311-14.
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implicate public performance rights;' nevertheless, a prudent legal
downloading service should seek licenses for the performance rights to

avoid potential liability for copyright infringement. Composition
copyrights are generally owned by music publishing companies and/or
the composers themselves; sound recording copyrights are commonly
owned by record companies. However, in the United States, it is
typical for licensees to go through three separate licensors in seeking
clearances to make a DPD available for download: (a) the composition
reproduction right is licensed via the Harry Fox Agency; (b) the
composition performance right is licensed via one of three performing
rights societies, ASCAP, BMI, or SESAC; 12 and (c) the sound recording
reproduction and performance rights are generally licensed directly
via the record companies or via distributors such as the Independent
13
Online Distribution Alliance or CDBaby's digital distribution arm.
For historical reasons, and in the case of ASCAP because of an antitrust consent decree, neither the performing rights organizations nor
Harry Fox have been capable of licensing both the performance and
reproduction rights on behalf of composition copyright owners.14
11.
Congress should clarify the issue of whether DPDs implicate performance
rights so that online providers can operate with greater certainty and potentially also
increase the offerings on their catalogues. While music publishers insist that every DPD
represents a public performance (and the record companies tend to concur on this point),
the U.S. Copyright Office has taken the position that DPDs do not implicate performance
rights, that composition copyright owners already receive compensation for licensing their
reproduction right in connection with DPDs, and that the practice of demanding additional
royalties for the performance right amounts to "double-dipping." Id. at 1318; see Digital
Music Licensing and Section 115 of the Copyright Act: Hearing before the Subcommittee on
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong., 2d Sess. 21-26 (Mar. 8, 2005) (testimony of Jonathan Potter, Executive Director,
Digital Media Association), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/Oversight.aspx?ID=104
(follow "Hearing PDF (Serial No. 109-6)" hyperlink). The Digital Performing Rights in
Sound Recordings Act of 1995 created a limited sound recording performance right for
digital audio transmissions, codified in Section 106(6) of the Copyright Act. Assuming that
DPDs implicate performance rights, DPDs would be classified as interactive transmissions
because the recipient selects the download; thus, pursuant to the Copyright Act, a
voluntary license must be negotiated with the recording copyright owners. Eric Leach, Do
the Right Thing, Electronic Musician (2001), http://emusician.com/mag/
emusic_righLthing/index.html.
12.
See KOHN & KOHN, supra note 7, at 1307-08.
13.
David Kostiner, Will Mechanicals Break the Digital Machine?: Determining a
Fair Mechanical Royalty Rate for Permanent Digital Phonographic Downloads, 27
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 653, 665 (2005).
14.
See generally Copyright Office Views on Music Licensing Reform: Hearing
Before the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 8-10 (Mar. 8, 2005) (testimony of Marybeth Peters, Register
of Copyrights, Copyright Office), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/
Oversight.aspx?ID=181 [hereinafter Peters] (follow "Hearing PDF (Serial No. 109-28)"
hyperlink).
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To further complicate the licensing process, each of the three
potential licensors utilized by the copyright owners employs its own
particular procedures and royalty rates. The blanket license offered
by the performing rights societies is no doubt the most streamlined
and efficient of the licensing processes: a licensee is periodically
charged a fee in exchange for a blanket license to use all of the
compositions in the respective performance rights society's catalogue;
the society then takes surveys to determine which compositions were
performed during the year and allocates the total collected revenue
among the particular songs performed in a particular medium, paying
out royalties to publishers and composers accordingly. 15
The
performing rights organizations also offer comprehensive listings to
potential licensees of the compositions in their catalogues.
In
contrast, licensing via the Harry Fox Agency or recording companies is
inherently more complicated, because each composition or recording
desired must be specifically requested by the licensee on an individual
basis, not on a blanket basis. Moreover, these licensors do not always
represent the publishers or record labels in licensing these types of
rights and they do not offer comprehensive listings of their catalogues.
Legal downloading services also face challenges and risks in
securing licenses for certain musical works for which it is difficult to
ascertain who in fact controls the rights. This problem may arise, for
instance, in connection with split copyrights where co-owners have
agreed not to license the work without the express agreement of all coowners; other thorny examples include terminated rights and
reversionary rights. In each of these scenarios, online providers
seeking to make hundreds of thousands of songs available for legal
download become vulnerable to statutory penalties for offering the
songs online, even if they arguably used every commercially
reasonable effort to discover the identity and location of the copyright
owner.
Royalty rates vary among the four categories of licenses.
Composition reproduction rights may be obtained via a compulsory
mechanical license, 16 whereby monthly royalties are paid to the
composition copyright owner(s) at the current statutory "penny" rate
of 9.1 cents per song or 1.75 cents per minute of playing time,
whichever is greater. 17 Alternatively, and more commonly, licensees
and the Harry Fox Agency negotiate a substitute royalty rate and

15.
16.

KOHN, supra note 7, at 1307.
17 U.S.C. § 115(a) (2000).
17.
U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright Royalty Rates: Section 115, the Mechanical
License, http://www.copyright.gov/carp/m200a.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).
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payment schedule.' 8
Royalty rates for the sound recording
reproduction right and the performance rights are negotiated on a
voluntary basis, and copyright owners may even refuse to grant
licenses.
The mechanical royalty rate commonly paid to composers by
record companies is the "three-quarter rate," or three-fourths of 9.1
cents, pursuant to the controlled composition clause of a typical
recording contract. 19 This arrangement is generally beneficial for
record companies in the context of traditional phonorecord
reproductions, but in the context of DPDs, where wholesale prices are
less than that of CDs as a result of reduced distribution costs on the
internet, record companies realize reduced profits but are still obliged
to pay composers the same royalty. This can become expensive for
record labels, especially for the smaller, independent labels that tend
to provide the most diverse music to the public.
Consequently,
recording companies are often forced to limit the repertoire available
for download on their websites as well as the repertoire that they
license to legal downloading services, resulting in a legal downloading
marketplace that has fewer offerings than the black market p2p sites.
B. Reverse-EngineeringProvisionsin the DMCA
Jurisdictions throughout the United States and around the
world have addressed the problem of anti-competitive business
practices in software markets by allowing reverse engineering for the
limited purpose of achieving interoperability. 20 Reverse engineering is
the process of taking a competitor's finished product apart and
working backward to determine how it was made. In the context of
the music industry, reverse engineering would resolve the
anticompetitive implications of the symbiotic linking of iTunes and
iPod, for example, by allowing competitors to reverse-engineer
software that allows downloads from sites other than iTunes to be

18.
Voluntary mechanical composition reproduction licenses are the norm because
of the burdensome monthly payment provisions of the compulsory license and competition
among composers. Kostiner, supra note 13, at 659 (citing DONALD PASSMAN, ALL YOU
NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MusIc BUSINESS 213 (Simon & Schuster 4th ed. 2000)).
19.
Kostiner, supra note 13, at 659-60.
20.
See, e.g., Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522,
550-51 (6th Cir. 2004) (permitting reverse engineering to provide printer cartridge
compatibility); Sega Enters., Inc. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1514 (9th Cir. 1992);
Copyright Amendment (Computer Programs) Bill of 1999 (Austl.); Council Directive
91/250, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42-46 (EC), availableat http://www.wipo.int/clea/docsnew/en/eu/
eu020en.html; H.K. Ord. No. 92 (1997); Republic Act 8293 of 1996 (Phil.); Copyright
(Amendment) Bill of 1998 (Sing.).
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played on the iPod, as well as other music players. Such a result
would lead to the availability of compatible devices necessary to
compete with the black market.
However, U.S. copyright law does not expressly permit the
reverse engineering of DRM to allow competitors to gain access to
proprietary music files and DPD playback devices.
The Digital
Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") criminalized the circumvention
of technical anti-piracy measures intended to protect intellectual
property, but created an exception permitting the circumvention of
copy control technology to enable "interoperability of an independently
created computer program with other programs ..
"..",21
"DMCA's
reverse engineering exemption is unlikely to apply to attempts to
produce compatible players because [downloaded] music files may not
qualify as 'computer programs.' "22 "A conflict has already erupted
between Apple and RealNetworks 0 over . . . software, called
Harmony, that allows RealNetworks users to play their downloads on
the iPod, as well as other devices." 23 RealNetworks claimed that
Apple was monopolizing the market for DPDs "and that
Real[Networks] was entitled to reverse engineer Apple's DRM to gain
device interoperability; Apple accused Real[Networks] of hacking its
24
proprietary system."
III. LEGISLATIVE AGENDA TO ATTAIN THE Two PRIMARY GOALS
A. Strategy to Make Available Larger Cataloguesof Downloadable
Music
1.

Blanket Licenses for Composition Reproduction and Performance
Rights

Rather than require DPD licensees to go through multiple
licensors, transaction costs would likely be minimized if licensees
could go through a single entity to license both the reproduction and
performance rights inherent in a musical composition copyright.
Presently, licensees seeking to license the reproduction and

21.

17 U.S.C. § 1201(f).

22.

Deborah Tussey, Music at the Edge of Chaos: A Complex Systems Perspective on

File Sharing, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 147, 208 n.262 (2005).
23.
Id. (citing Laurie J. Flynn, Apple Attacks RealNetworks Plan to Sell Songs for
iPod, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2004, at C3).

24.

Id.
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performance rights inherent in a digital audio transmission of a sound
recording can secure both via negotiation with the record company;
however, licensees seeking to license the reproduction and
performance rights inherent in a composition copyright must enter
into separate agreements with Harry Fox (for the reproduction rights)
and one of the performing rights organizations (for the performance
rights).
The functions of Harry Fox and the performing rights
organizations could be merged to allow for more efficient "one-stop
shopping" on the part of licensees.
The newly created entities authorized to license composition
reproduction and performance rights would be known as music rights
organizations ('MROs").25 Existing performance rights societies would
automatically become MROs, and other entities could also serve as
"MROs if they obtain the necessary authorization from the copyright
owner[s]. '"26 The MROs would license composition reproduction and
performance rights on a blanket basis because blanket licenses
eliminate transaction costs involved in negotiating individual licenses
and lead to wider availability and use of the catalogued compositions
by licensees; therefore, composition copyright owners stand to earn
more royalties via blanket licenses than they do under individual
licenses. 27
An MRO's recovery of statutory damages for the
infringement of a work would be predicated upon the MRO's having
listed the work in its comprehensive catalogue and upon the MRO's
designation by the composition copyright owners as the only entity
authorized to license the particular composition.
Although
composition copyright owners would retain the ability to enter into
direct licenses with licensees, the increased efficiency of the single
licensing entity would provide an incentive for owners to utilize the
MROs.

25.
This proposal has been suggested by Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights,
Copyright Office. Peters, supra note 14, at 21-22.
26.
Id. at 22.
27.
Supporters of individual licenses may argue that blanket licenses are only
utilized in connection with public performance rights because it is so difficult to track
performances in nightclubs, restaurants, etc., and that composition reproduction rights
should not be subject to a blanket license because it is possible to document each time a
phonorecord is downloaded.
However, royalties from blanket licenses need not be
disbursed based solely on surveys of works that were performed/reproduced during a given
year; it would be possible to input detailed records of downloaded phonorecords to more
accurately disburse the blanket reproduction license fees.

512

VANDERBILTJ OFENTERTAINMENTAND TECH.LAW
2.

[Vol. 8:3:503

Safe Harbor to Protect Legal Downloading Services From
Infringement Lawsuits

To address the difficulties in identifying copyright owners,
Congress should enact legislation to establish a "safe harbor," whereby
online music providers could pay into a fund, administered by an
entity such as the Library of Congress, from which "[a]rtists and other
copyright holders who later demand compensation for the use of a

particular song could be paid

....

",28

Coupled with the requirement

for MROs to offer comprehensive listings of the works in their
catalogues, a safe harbor provision would provide legal downloading
services with a greater degree of security to operate by minimizing the
risks inherent in licensing split copyrights and other works, where it
is difficult to ascertain who in fact controls the rights and where
failure to identify a copyright owner exposes online providers to
liability for copyright infringement. Consequently, online providers
would be in a position to offer a larger catalogue of legally
downloadable music.
3.

Enactment of a Percentage-Based Compulsory Royalty Rate

Record companies would be more inclined to make their
recordings available online if the compulsory royalty rate for
composition reproduction rights were set as a percentage of the
wholesale price of the recording; the same percentage-rate would
apply regardless of the medium of distribution (i.e., CDs vs. DPDs).
"Most other countries set the mechanical royalty as a percentage of
the work's wholesale value in order to ensure that the rate maintains
its purchasing power under inflationary pressure. This method also
allows room for new means of [digital] distribution .
"..."29 Because
distribution costs involved in marketing DPDs are minimal compared
with physical distribution of the same compositions, a percentage
mechanical royalty rate would allow for composers to be paid
proportionally less in connection with DPDs. For example, if a record
label's wholesale income "is [17%] less for a DPD than for the physical
sale an album," the composer would accordingly be paid 17% less than

28.
This proposal has been suggested by Dick Boucher (D - Va.) of the House
Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property. Molly M.
Peterson, Smith: Online Copyright Bill Unlikely To Move This Year, CONG. DAILY, 2005
WLNR 14419936 (Sept. 13, 2005).
29.
Kostiner, supra note 13, at 661; see also Amy Ai Dac Lam, Internet Music
Downloads: A Copyright Owner's Protection of Royalties in the United States and Abroad,
34 SW. U. L. REv. 267, 274-75 (2004).
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what he would earn in royalties for a physical reproduction. 30 To
protect composers from record labels who might elect "to sell a [DPD]
at [such] a low value so as to cause the composer's set percentageshare to be far below the current statutory value," the percentagebased royalty might also be coupled with a floor: a minimum pennyrate amount to ensure that composers get paid something, even when
record companies engage in price wars to gain market-share of the
download market. 31 Although at first glance this arrangement might
seem to shortchange composition copyright owners, the composers
would ultimately realize greater profits, because record labels would
make more songs available for download and, ultimately, more songs
would be purchased overall.
4.

Application of the Blanket Compulsory License and PercentageRate Royalty to Sound Recording Copyrights

Although record companies would probably resist the idea,
reduced transaction costs and greater efficiency would likely result if
the formula of blanket compulsory licenses and percentage-rate
royalties were also applied to sound recording copyrights. In a world
where the same MROs that license composition rights could also
license sound recording reproduction and performance rights on behalf
of recording companies, online providers could potentially go through
a single source to secure each of the four rights associated with DPDs.
The statutory royalty rate range, consisting of a percentage-rate
ceiling and penny-rate floor as discussed above in connection with
composition reproduction rights, could also be successfully applied to
the licensing of sound recording rights. Recording companies would
have to relinquish some control with respect to setting the terms of
licenses, but would potentially gain increased revenues due to reduced
transaction costs and increased sales of DPDs overall.
B. Strategy to Encourage the Development of Compatible Devices
To provide flexibility to consumers and to assure continued
competition in the online music distribution market, Congress should
clarify the text of Section 1201(f) of the DMCA to permit reverseengineering for purposes of achieving interoperability of DPD files and
devices for DPD playback, storage, and downloading. Said statute
30.
Kostiner, supra note 13, at 668. A percentage-rate in the area of 12.7% would
assure that composers continue to earn the same royalties that they have historically
earned for physical reproductions of their works. Id.
31.
Id. at 665.
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permits the circumvention of copy control technology only "to achieve
interoperability of an independently created computer program with
other programs." In addition to allowing reverse-engineering for
purposes of enabling computer programs to exchange information,
such measures should specifically be authorized in connection with
attempts to achieve interoperability of independently created DPD
files and devices for DPD playback, storage, and downloading. Such a
clarification would give a green light to activities like RealNetworks's
efforts to achieve interoperability with the iPod, and would ultimately
lead to the availability of compatibility-enabling software necessary to
compete with the black market.
IV. CONCLUSION

Legal downloading providers are aspiring to offer services that
are altogether more attractive than that of the illegal file-sharing
networks, but their success has been limited by the amount and
variety of music that record labels and publishers are willing to make
available to consumers via antiquated licensing procedures.
Additionally, the proprietary product designs disseminated by
companies seeking to gain a foothold in the digital distribution market
ultimately constitute a further impediment to the success of the online
distribution business model since consumers understandably desire
flexibility in their uses of DPDs.
Congress can aid the music industry in improving these
aspects of the legal downloading services by establishing a more
streamlined licensing regime, creating a safe-harbor from potential
infringement lawsuits to legal downloading services, instituting more
equitable compulsory royalty rates, and permitting reverseengineering for purposes of achieving interoperability of DPD files and
devices.
By implementing these legislative changes, the music
industry will finally be able to offer legal downloading services that
can compete with the illegal file sharing networks and will be in a
position to win back the customers lost to piracy.

